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List 1, Sheet 1 
v. 
Hardesty {Tax Com-
missioner of W. 
Va.} 
1. SUMMARY: 
~ rom Supreme Court of 
~0i~g inia {Miller} 
State/Civil Timely 
Appt argues that imposing the West VIr-
ginia business and occupations tax, which is a gross receipts 
tpx, on the sales of three of its divisions violates the Com-
merce Clause and the Due Process Clause. 
1 ~ ~ 1 ~ ~~ v~~ 4~\ ~%. 
I\ ~ °' t~. l.\i 
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2. FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: West Virginia imposes 
gross receipts tax on wholesale sales. However, a manufactur-
~
er who manufactures within West Virginia is exempt from this 
'--------------~ .... ----------
tax. -- Appt is an Ohio corporation that is qualified to do 
business in West Virginia. It is divided into a number of 
divisions. The Mining Division engages in extensive coal min-----
Two of 
the other divisions, t 
Group manufactured goods outside of West Virginia. These two 
groups had no sales offices in West Virginia, _b..ut sent sales-- ---
man to West Virginia. The salesmen relayed orders to the out 
of state office which had the authority to accept or reject 
the orders. Goods were shipped into the state by common car-
? 
rier, with title passing to the common ' car the out of 
products 
division maintained a sales office in West ~Virginia. However, 
one of the divisions _products, metal buildings, was sold ex-
clusively by a franchisee. Appt brought this action, contend-
ing that the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause forbid 
<'-
the application of West Virginia's
1
6usiness and occupation tax 
on the sales of metal buildings and on the sales by the Steel - •:::;' 
Group and the Union Wire Rope Group. 
The Tax Commissioner rejected appt' s claims. It held 
that the activities of the salesmen in soliciting orders and 
. . 
in checking on the buyers' satisfaction created a sufficient 
nexus to permft the taxation of the sales by the Steel and 
- 3 -
Wire Groups. It determined that appt's close cooperation with 
its franchisees created a suffiecient nexus to tax the sale of 
the Steel Buildings. 
The ~ rcuit Court reversed. It held that the activi-
ties of the traveling salesmen were insufficient to establish 
the required nexus. The court held that the Metal Buuildings 
Division had no physical presence in West Virginia. Therefore 
it had an insufficient nexus. The court concluded that impo-
sition of the tax would violate the Commerce and Due Process 
Clauses. 
The ~ reme Court of West Virginia reversed. It held 
that the Commerce and Due Process Clauses are satisfied if a 
business has a 1 ubstantial nexu~ with the taxing state, there 
--, 
is a rational relationship between the tax imposed and the 
benefits reaped from activities in the state, and the tax is 
not discrinmintaory or unfairly apportioned. 
The court held that it could consider all of etr' s 
activiti~ in West Virginia, including its coal mining activi-
ties, in determining whether the required nexus had been es-
tablished. The court recognized that in Norton Co v. Depart-
ment of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951) this court 
held that a corporation could avoid taxation if it could show 
that the "particular transactions are dissociated from the 
local business and intertstate in character." However, the 
court concluded that subsequent cases such as General Motors 
•Corp v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Standard Pressed 
Steel Co. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); 
- 4 -
(,,, 
and Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 
(1980) had weakened the Norton test. In General Motors, ac-
cording to this Court examined a gross receipts tax and, ac-
cording to the West Virginia Court, examined the total busi-
ness activities conducted by G.M. in Washington, rather than 
the precise business done by each division. In Standard 
Pressed Steel, the Court found the presence of a single in 
state employee who made poossible the_continued relationship 
between Standard and its in-state customer to be a sufficient 
nexus. Finally,~ Exxon, the court permitted an income tax 
to be imposed on production and refining when only marketing 
activities took place in the taxing state. This Court based 
the state's power to tax all teh activities on a finding that 
Exxon was a unitary business. The court concluded that under 
these cases, the Norton rule did not apply to a unitary busi-
ness. Thus, the court could consider all of the activities of 
the corporation to establish the requisite nexus. The court 
concluded that the requisiste nexus was established. 
The court also rejected petr 's claim that the tax was 
discriminatory because it contained an exemption for in-state 
manufacturers. First, the exemption was available to an out 
of state corporation that manufactured in West Virginia. Sec-
ond, in-state manufacturers were required to pay a tax that 
petr was not required to pay. Therefore the tax did not dis-
criminate. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appt argues that the decision in 
the instant case conflicts with this court's holding in Nor-
- 5 -
ton, supra. Other state courts ahve continued to recognize 
the validity of the principle enunciated in Norton, that a 
corporation that is doing business in a state may avoid tax-
ation on a transaction if it can show that the particular 
transactions are dissociated from the local activity. See, 
e.g., Alaska v. Sears & Roebusck, 660 P.2d 1188 (Alaska 1983); 
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 98 Wash. 
2d 814, petition for cert filed, No. 82-1848 (1983). The 
cases relied on by the West Virginia Corut did not weaken Nor-
ton. In General Motors, this Court explicitly recognized that 
Norton stated the governing principle for gross receipt taxes. 
Further, in both General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel, 
the in-state activities had a greater nexus with the out · of 
state actvities than in the instant case. The West Virginia 
Court's reliance on Exxon was misplaced. Exxon involved an 
income tax. The difficulties in determining each state's fair 
share of net income justify the unitary concept in income tax-
es. There is no such dificulty in applying a gross receipts 
tax. Even if the in-state solicitations were held to be a 
sufficient nexus, many of the transactions were the result of 
out of state solicitations. Under American Oil Co. v. Neil, 
380 U.S. 451 (1965) these transactions may not be taxed. Fi-
nally the tax is discriminatory because it exempts the sales 
of in-state manufacturers. That appt could avail itself of 
the same exemption by moving to West Virginia is irrelevant. 
• The tax burden imposed on interstate sales is greater since 
the state in which the manufacturing occurs may also impose a 
( 
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tax on the manufacturer. Thus, an out of state manufacturer 
may be taxed twice where the in-state manufacturer is only 
taxed once. For this reason, the West Virginia tax violates 
the commerce clause. 
4. DISCUSSION: Appt has a strong argument that the 
I l ~, 
West Virginia Court applied the wrong test in evaluating the .,...~ , . . -
constitutionality of applying its tax in this case. As appt 
notes, under Norton, a corporations i~-state activities must 
be related to the transaction that the state seeks to tax. I 
do not think that General Motors can fairly be read as aban-
doning this rule. Although the court did refer to the "bundle 
of corporate activities" in determining whether there were 
sufficient in-state contacts, the court also specifically held 
that the taxpayer had not met his burden of showing that the 
in-state activities were dissociated from the taxed transac-
tions. This Court's ff ailure to (separate~ analyzeJ the activ-
ities of ~ division at certain points in the opinion can be 
explained by the fact that the actvi ties were in some cases 
1 similar, and in other cases, interrelated. Additionaly, in 
American Oil Co. v. Neil, 380 U.S. 451 (1965), which was de-
cided after General Motors, this court explicitly relied on 
the dissociation principle to invalidate an excise tax. 
Standard Pressed Steeel did not purport to change the rule. 
Rather, it merely relied on General Motors. 
Appt 2:,..s also correct that the problems invloved in de-
, I ,, 
'termining a stat'e fair proprotion of an income tax are dif-
ferent from those involved in making the same determination 
I . • 
\ 
If ,\ 
about a gross receipts tax. Thus, Exxon did not overrule Nor-
ton. Additionally, although none of the state cases relied on 
by appt found that a taxpayer had shown dissociation, they 
continue to adhere to Norton as stating the governing rule. 
Assuming that the transactinos that were solicited out 
of state were unrelated to the in-state activities, appt is 
correct that under Neil, supra, they may not be taxed. 
Appt's discrimination argument is weaker. As the West '-- ----------=~ 
Virginia Court noted, that state actually taxes goods manufac-
tured out of state at a lower rate than those manufactured in-
state. Had West Virginia chosen to impose the gross receipts 
tax on in state manufacturers and lower its manufacturing 
tax, petr could not raise his discrimination argument Yet the 
difference between this hypothetical tax scheme and the tax 
scheme actually utilized is merely one of form. Additionally, 
essentially, appt's argument is that there is a risk of multi-
ple taxation. However, the burden is on the taxpayer to demon-
strate that there is multiple taxation. See Standard Steel, 
supra, at 563: General Motors, supra, at 449. Appt's invoca-
tion of a possibility of multiple taxation is not sufficient 
to carry that burden. 
. This court has noted probable jurisdiction in Bacchus 
~ Imports, Inc. v. Freitas, 656 P.2d 724 (Hawaii 1983). This 
~ case deals with the related issue of whether Hawaii may exempt 
from its excise tax on liquors certain liquors that are pro-
duced in Hawaii. However, I do not think that this case needs 
- 8 -
to be held for Bacchus. Unlike West Virginia, Hawaii does 
not have a compensating tax on local manufacturers. 
I recommed calling for a response. 
There is no response 
There is a motion to consider this case in tandem with 
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. 
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83-295 Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is a brief memo to refresh my recollection. 
The case is important and I will need to spend more time 
on the briefs as well as have the views of my clerk. 
'!he Facts 
Armco challenges the validity of West Virginia's 
business and occupation tax. The amount of the tax is 
computed on the basis of "gross receipts" from the sale of 
tangible property within the state. 
three types of business in the state. 
its wholesale sales are at issue. 
below. 
Armco engages in 
In this case only 
These are described 
The tax also is imposed upon nonresidents that 
engage in manufacturing and mining within the state. 
Neither of these activities is directly at issue. Armco 
o,,Jl-
concedes that its cold mining is subject to the t ~ d,.... _. 
this has been paid. 
The facts with respect to wholesale sales is 
summarized on p. 4 of Armco's brief. Three group 
divisions of the company make sales in the state: the 
steel group, wire rope group, and Metal Products division. 
All of the sales made in the state by these divisions had 
"the following attributes in common": 
There were (i) no salesmen resident in the 
state; (ii) no manfacturing facilities there; (iii) no 
sales or other off ices in the state; (iv) no inventories 
of the products of these three divisions were maintained; 
(v) all orders were accepted or rejected outside of the 
state either in West Virginia or Ohio; (vi) the products 
were shipped by common carrier from outside of the state, 
and title was transferred "to the purchaser" at the time 
of delivery to the carrier; and (vii) Armco did not 
install, service or repair any of these products. 
The one activity within the state was the 
solicitation of orders by a total of seven salesmen. The 
Metal Products Division sold only to two franchise dealers 
and there was no solicitation within the state. But steel 
products and wire rope products were solicited, with 
separate salesmen for each type product. The salesmen 
worked out of offices in other states and did not maintain 
residences in West Virginia. 
Armco's Metal Products Division did have an 
office in West Virginia, and, of course, it did a 
substantial amount of coal mining and sales business 
within the state. In addition to the tax on the coal 
activities having been paid, this also was true as to the 
Metal Products Division (Br. p. 5). 
Armco's Argument 
It relies on the due process and commence 
clauses and with respect to each argues that there was an 
absence of a sufficient "nexus" between Armco's activities 
with respect to the divisons at issue, and its activities 
in West Virginia. 
Due Process. 
support state taxation: 
Two requirements must be met to 
(a) a "minimal connection" or 
"nexus" between the interstate activities and the taxing 
state and (b) a "rational relationship between the income 
attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the 
enterprise." Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 
447 U.S. 207, 219-20; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of 
Taxation, 445 u.s. 425, 436-37 (1980). 
Commerce Clause. This requires that the 
activities to which the tax applies must have a 
substantial nexus with the state, the tax must be "fairly 
apportioned", "be fairly GJ related to the services 
provided by the state", and not discriminate against 
~ 
. .•. 
interstate commerce. Armco relies principally on Complete 
Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279. 
The brief argues that "there is [not] the 
slightest indication [in the record] that the sales in 
question were anything other than "disassociated" with the 
company's local business activities in West Virginia. (p. 
13, et seq.) 
Armco relies heavily on Norton Co. v. Dept. of 
Revenue of Illinois, 340 u.s. 534 (1951) that held that 
for gross receipts taxes, the nexus test is whether 
"particular transactions are disassociated with the local 
busines". The argument is made that the Divisions of 
. . . """"' Armco operated separately, and that the D1v1s1os at issue 
~ 
in this case were entirely "disassociated" from the two 
divisions coal and Metal Products that maintained offices 
within the state. 
Armco's Commerce Clause argument is that the 
~ 
gross i\ tax discriminates against interstate commerce. 
Discrimination exists because intrastate sales of locally 
made products are exempt from the wholesale gross receipts 
tax. Thus wholesale sales made in interstate commerce 
were subject to a tax not imposed on wholesale sales made 
on intrastate commerce. 
The State's Arguments 
On the due process issue, the state argues that 
the state may levy a tax on interstate business if there 
is a "minimal connection" between the taxing state and the 
income producing activities. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 
437 u. s. 267 (1968). ( I note here that Complete Auto 
~ansit spoke of the requirement for a "substantial 
connection". The state argues that each of the seven 
sales representatives who visited West Virginia "were 
available to advise propspective customers of Armco's line 
of products, and to make recommendations and provide 
advice concerning the customer's specific product needs". 
Also, after sales were consummted, the sales 
representatives made follow-up calls to ascertain whether 
the customer was satisfied. 
"minimal nexus" requirement. 
This activity satisfied the 
The state has a little more trouble with the 
Commerce Clause issue, particularly in view of the 
discrimination against interstate sales noted above. The 
state therefore relies on the "unitary business" concept 
that recent decisions of this Court have applied to 
apportionment~ot net incomif In support of this 
argument, the state views all of Armco's busincess in West 
Virginia (including the coal and Metal divisions) as 
constituting a "unitary" business operation in West 
Virginia. 
Armco answers by contending that the unitary 
concept has never been applied to a gross receipts tax. 
Armco relies on the description of the "unitary business 
principle" contained in last Term's opinion in Container 
Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board (WJB 's opinion) • 
brief continues as follows: 
Armco's 
"The unitary business principle is 
reconcilable with the constitutional prohibition 
against state taxation of extraterritorial 
values only by reason of factors ~ec~liar to net 
income taxes. The impossioility of allocating a 
taxpayer Is' total net income a"irectly a-;--ong two 
or more srcH:t!s 1J!d '\:ts' "thE!" _practice of defining 
total net income re a IT zed by_ .. tne • faxpayer 's 
unitary !Susiness~ and tnen apportioning '"that 
tot'a1 net '"income among the states by formulae. 
No~ulty is presented by a non-
apportioned gross receipts tax such as the West 
Virginia tax imposed on Armco." 
* * * 
'!he above summary obviously is deficient in many 
respects, and I will have to have some help particularly 
with respect to the cases most nearly relevant. I will 
not want a long memo from the clerk, but I would like a 
summary one if time should be available. 
jen 04/10/84 ~ ¥/1.s-
r ~~~~4 U-<._ 
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Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty 
Joseph Neuhaus April 10, 1984 
Question Presented 
Does West Virginia's gross receipts tax on wholesale sales 
violate the Due Process or Commerce Clauses where (a) it is ap-
plied to an out-of-state company's divisions that sell to West 
Virginia buyers through nonresident salesmen, and (b) resident 
manufacturing companies are exempt? 
l 
No. 83-297: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty page 2. 
Summary of Facts & Decision Below 
For the tax years at issue, Armco, an Ohio corporation, had a 
variety of operations in West Virginia as to which it concedes 
taxability. This litigation concerns three product lines that 
were sold in West Virginia separately from Armco's other opera-
tions. The products of the ~ire rope and 'steel divisions were 
sold via orders solicited by a total of seven nonresident sales-
men, each of whom visited the state once or twice a month. The 
./ metal buildings division sold its products via two franchised 
dealers. 
The state supreme court upheld the application of the state's 
gross receipts tax to the wholesale sales of these three divi-
/T) ----
sions. It hel~hat Armco should be considered a ~ni tary busi-
"I ness for purposes of determining whether there was a sufficient 
"nexus" with the state to allow taxation of the company's sales 
generally. The court held that, so considered, there was such a 
nexus. In addition, the court held th~ he tax was fairly ap-
portioned because there was a rational relationship between the -tax and the benefits and services provided to Armco's ~ ac-
. 3 h d1"d tivities in the state. Finally, the court held th t e tax 
not unconstitutionally discriminate against interstate commerce 
simply because it exempted in-state manufacturers. These manu-
facturers were subject to a compensating, and much higher, manu-
facturing tax. 
No. 83-297: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty page 3. 
Discussion 
1. Nexus. There is a nexus test under both the Due Process -
and Commerce Clauses. The first question to consider is whether 
the taxpayer's contacts with the state are to be considered in 
toto, or whether the contacts with respect to the sales of each 
product should be considered separately. While the court below 
recognized that this Court had specified the latter view 
ton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 340 u.s. 534, 537 (1951), it 
in Nor- i~1::: 
thought ~ 
that more recent cases had abandoned that position. In this it 
was mis taken. The Court in General Motors v. Washington, 377 
u.s. 436, 441 (1964), specifically quoted the test that a taxpay-
er is entitled to show that some of its business is "dissociated" 
from the local activities that are the claimed nexus. The Court 
appears to have held that no such dissociation was possible, and 
upheld the tax. The Court in Standard Steel Co. v. Washington 
Revenue Dept., 419 U.S. 560 (1975), the other case primarily re-
lied upon below, had no occasion to consider the dissociation 
question, since only a single set of sales was at issue. The 
Court in any case merely relied on GM. 
The court below also relied on "unitary" business case for 
further support for its conclusion. These cases are essentially 
irrelevant to a gross receipts tax for two reasons. First, the 
unitary business concept as such has no application where there 
is no formula that is applied to the combined income in order to 
divide it up among the various jurisdictions. There is no formu-
la he~e. West Virginia allocates various taxable units by refer-
ence to what was sold. That is, the state is perfectly willing 
to tax the transactions at issue here as it finds them. Thus, 
.• 
No. 83-297: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty page 4. 
there is no need artificially to combine the sales of various 
products in order to apportion them to the correct category. The 
second, and related reason, is that there is no sensible reason 
It \~ 
to impose a unitary apportionment s on transactions rather -
than net income. . ....__..__, ---- The location and price of the transactions are 
readily identified--at least, as here, where the transactions 
occur between entities that are not commonly owned. Unitary ap-
portionment formulas are inherently rough and approximate devices 
to be used only when the realities of the market do not reliably 
identify the liable taxpayer. 
I also do not find persuasive the state's argument here that 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 u.s. 274 (1977), has 
' t made the Norton test obsolete. The nexus "" test is intended to ~ 
ensure that a taxpayer pays for the benefits and services 
'-.__.., . r' 
,.. ' 
'!;fM-4<.~ 
prov id- 1-4--/-. 
~ ed~ e. The fact that the taxpayer does completely un-
~ related business in the state may have nothing to do with whether 
it derives benefits in making the sales at issue here. There is 
nothing in the case of a gross receipts tax that prevents a "pay 
as you go" approach, so the state should not be allowed to use a 
far rougher method. In short, the Norton test makes sense in the 
case of a gross receipts tax. 
Thus, we must look to the separate connections of each trans-
action, or set of transactions, involved here to see if the con-
sti tutional tests are satisfied. As you noted in your memo to 
the file of April 6, it has been said that the Due Process Clause 
imposes a "minimal connection" test, while the Commerce Clause 
test is frequently stated as requiring a "substantial nexus." 
No. 83-297: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty page 5. 
This Court, however, has not distinguished between the two tests, 
and the Court's opinion in~ ntainer Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., ~f 
103 s.ct. 2933, 2940 (1983), said that both Clauses were satis-~'f 
~:;.~ 
fied by a "minimal connection" test. See also National Bellas ~ 
Hess. Inc. v. Dept. of ;:enue, ~ 6 u.s. 753, 756 (1966) ~
that the two tests are "similar" and quoting the "minimum connec-~· 
tion" test). The question thus is whether the sales here, accom-
plished by nonresident salesmen and independent franchisees, sat-
isfy this test. 
The cases on the sufficiency of connections in this context 
appear to be arrayed as follows. Gross receipts and use taxes 
may not be imposed on purely mail order business. National 
Bellas Hess v. Dept. of Revenue, 386 u.s. 753 (1967) (use tax); 
Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 539 (1951) (gross 
receipts tax). On the other hand, businesses that have any kind ---------- -----L ,'-
Of solicitation £E presence by persons ' resident in the state, -----------
including independent contractors, are subject to such taxes. 
Standard Steel Co. v. Washington Revenue Dept. , 419 U.S. 560 
(1975) (single employee to serve large customer); General Motors 
v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1963) (district managers and service 
representatives were residents); Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 
211 (1960) (independent contractors--contrary rule "would open 
the gates to a stampede of tax avoidance") • In between is one 
rather old case, McLeod v. Dilworth Co. , 322 U.S. 327 ( 1944) , 
that j.s very close to this one in certain respects. The Court 
held sales solicited by traveling salesmen in Arkansas for a Ten-
nessee corporation were immune from the Arkansas sales tax. 
No. 83-297: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty page 6. 
In my view, McLeod is a questionable precedent. As the State ----------....., 
of Washington as amicus argues, that case relied heavily on a 
distinction between €9 an@ taxes that makes no sense after 
Complete Auto Transit (and made little sense before). The dis-
tinction appears to have been based on the idea that a sales tax 
reaches a completely interstate transaction, while a use tax tax-
es something after it has come to rest in the state. See 322 
u.s., at 329, 330-331. That distinction is irrelevant now that ------------
interstate commerce can be taxed directly. In addition, as a 
practical rather than legal matter, it seems to me senseless to 
distinguish between employees or agents who have homes in the 
state and those who do not. It can make no constitutional dif-
ference that Armco operates through seven salesmen who spend part 
of their time in the state instead of one salesman who spends 
most or all of his time there. Thus, I would hold that the sales 
through franchisees are subject to tax under Scripto, and that 
the sales through salesmen are subject to tax under Standard 
Steel and GM. 
While the question need not be reached in this case, I might 
add that I also question the wisdom of the line drawn in Norton 
and National Bellas, which held that purely mail order sales were 
exempt from local taxes. If the idea is to ensure that a seller 
pays for the benefits an.f services it derives, it seems to me 
that mail order businesses derive substantial benefits from being 
able to sell to residents in a state. They use the state's roads 
and communications facilities, and generally accept checks drawn 
on the state's banks. In addition, they derive indirect benefits 
No. 83-297: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty page 7. 
from the fact that their buyers live and are employed in a civi-
lized and stable society and economy. I will admit that the bur-
den on interstate commerce is somewhat greater when businesses 
whose only contact with the state is mail order sales are taxed 
than when, as in this case, taxes are laid on businesses which 
have entered the state in a more substantial and physical fash-
ion. As a practical matter, however, I doubt the burden is very 
great in the former case, at least where there is some minimum 
threshold of sales. Cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., No. 
82-485 (3/20/84) (magazine circulation of 10,000 to 15,000 copies 
is sufficient for personal j ur isd iction) . (Also analogous are 
state products liability laws that hold a manufacturer liable for 
any injury done in the state.) In any event, the present case is 
far easier: here the taxpayer has physically and systematically 
entered the state in order to serve the local market. I think 
this provides a nexus that is sufficient under the Due Process 
and Commerce Clause for the taxes laid here. 
2. Discrimination. Under the Commerce Clause a tax may not, 
at least on its face, discriminate against interstate commerce in 
favor of intrastate commerce. That is, a state may not tax a 
transaction more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it 
occurs entirely in the state. The tax here violates that princi-
ple, and therefore should be invalidated. 
On its face, the tax here does discriminate against inter-
state ,commerce, because it exempts wholesale sales made by West 
Virginia ma~u! actu..re..LJ> while requiring payment on sales of goods ...  
originating out of state. West Virginia's argument that its man-
No. 83-297: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty page 8. 
ufacturers are already subject to a much higher tax is unpersua-
sive. If Ohio imposes a like tax on its manufacturers--which it 
has every right to do--then Armco and other interstate sellers 
will pay both a manufacturi~g tax and a wholesale tax while resi-
dent sellers will only pay the manufacturing tax. To illustrate, 
if Ohio were to adopt the same scheme, then an interstate seller r 
would pay the manufacturing tax of .88% and the gross receipts or-4~ 
.25%; a purely intrastate seller would pay only the manufacturing 
tax of .88% and would be exempt from the gross receipts tax. 
West Virginia's answer to this is that Armco may not rely on 
the theoretical possibility of bearing a heavier aggregate tax 
burden than its West Virginia competitors, but must prove actual 
discriminatory impact. If Ohio or the other states in which 
Armco has factories do not impose a manufacturing tax, the argu-
ment goes, then Armco is in fact ahead of the game. This is the 
wrong test. The Court in Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 
103 s.ct. 2933, 2942 (1983), correctly stated the test as being 
that the tax must have "internal consistency--that is the [tax] 
must be such that, if applied to every jurisdiction, it would 
result" in no discrimination. See also id., at 2943. Thus, one 
asks whether the tax would result in discrimination against in-
terstate commerce if applied in every state. That this is the 
right test is clear by a look at the alternatives: Armco should 
not be required to burden the courts with a detailed examination 
of the interrelated provisions of the tax code of every state in 
which it operates to see whether it can show that West Virginia's 
facially discriminatory tax will result in actual discrimination. 
• 
No. 83-297: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty page 9 • 
West Virginia is wrong when it suggests that the rules laid 
out above could be corrected by a merely formal change in the tax 
structure. It is true that the only change required would be to 
reduce the manufacturing tax and apply the wholesale sales tax to 
all sellers uniformly. But this scheme, if applied in Ohio as 
well, would not discriminate against interstate commerce. To 
illustrate, if the manufacturing tax in both Ohio and West Vir-
ginia were reduced by . 25% to . 63% and the exemption from the 
gross receipts tax for in-state manufacturers were removed, both 
an interstate and an intrastate seller would pay the same aggre-
gate tax--.63% to the state in which they manufacture and .25% to 
the state in which they sell. 
RECOMMENDATION: Reverse because the tax discriminates 
against interstate commerce. 
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: No. 83-297 Armco Inc. v. Hardesty 
Here is a chambers draft of the opinion in this case. In 
line with your comments, I have deleted a footnote that described 
the circuit court's opinion as construing the statute to avoid 
unconstitutionality (the point was of marginal relevance) ~ I 
have deleted the paragraph that discussed the possibility of 
remedying the violation by splitting the manufacturer's tax. The 
citechecker and readers suggested some minor stylistic changes. 
...... ~-----........._ > 
The most extensive change is in footnote 7, where I have 
rewritten the discussion of the Caskey case. Other language 
changes are on pp. 2 & 4. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this appeal an Ohio corporation claims that West 
Virginia's wholesale gross receipts tax, from which local 
manufacturers are exempt, unconstitutionally discriminates 
against interstate commerce. We agree and reverse the 
state court's judgment upholding the tax. 
I 
Appellant Armco Inc. is an Ohio corporation qualified 
to do business in West Virginia. Its primary business is 
manufacturing and selling steel products. From 1970 
through 1975, the time at issue here, Armco conducted 
business in West Virginia through five divisions or 
subdivisions. Two of these had facilities and employees 
in the State, while the other three sold various products 
to customers in the State only through franchisees or 
nonresident traveling salesmen. 1 









West Virginia imposes a gross receipts tax on persons 
engaged in the business of selling tangible property at 
wholesale. w. Va. Code §ll-13-2c (1983) • 2 For the years 
1970 through 1975 Armco took the position that the gross 
receipts tax could not be imposed on the sales it made 
through franchisees and nonresident salesmen. In 
1The company's Mining Division mined, cleaned, and 
sold coal in the State, and part of the Metal Products 
Division sold various construction and drainage products 
through an office in the State staffed by three employees. 
The Metal Products Division's metal buildings were sold in 
the State exclusively by two franchised dealers resident 
in the State. The Steel Group and the Union Wire Rope 
Group had no office in West Virginia but sold steel and 
wire rope through nonresident traveling salesmen who 
solicited sales from customers in the State. 
2For the 
provided: 
years 1971 through 1975, §ll-13-2c 
"Upon every person engaging or continuing 
within this State in the business of selling any 
tangible property whatsoever, real or personal, 
there is hereby levied, and shall be 
collected, a tax equivalent to fifty-five one 
hundredths of one percent of the gross income of 
the business, except that in the business of 
selling at wholesale the tax shall be equal to 
twenty-seven one hundredths of one percent of 
the gross income of the business." 1971 w. Va. 
Acts, ch. 169. 
The tax on wholesale gross receipts was • 25% prior to 
1971. 1959 w. Va. Acts, ch. 167. 
I 
3. 
addition, because local manufacturers were exempt from the 
tax, see id., §11-13-2, 3 Armco argued that the tax 
discriminated against interstate commerce. After a 
hearing, the State Tax Commissioner, who is appellee here, 
determined that the tax was properly assessed on the sales 
at issue, and that Armco had not shown the tax was 
discriminatory. 4 The Circuit Court of Kanawha County 
~ 
reversed, holding that t:aerQ- W«• an- iRsu£f iG4:-ent .-, nexus 
between the sales and the Sta~~ition of 
3w. Va. Code §11-13-2 provides an exemption for 
persons engaged in the State in manufacturing or in 
extracting natural resources, and selling their products. 
For the years at issue here, it read as follows: 
"[A] ny person exercising any privilege taxable 
under sections two-a [extracting and producing 
natural resources for sale] or two-b 
[manufacturing] of this article and engaging in 
the business of selling his natural resources or 
manufactured products to producers of natural 
resources, manufacturers, wholesalers, jobbers, 
retailers or commercial consumers for use or 
consumption in the purchaser's business shall 
not be requred to pay the tax imposed in section 
two-c [§ll-13-2c] of this article." 1955 w. Va. 
Acts, ch. 165: 1971 w. Va. Acts, ch. 169. 
4The Commissioner waived statutory penal ties on the 
disputed amount because he found that Armco's objections 
were a "good faith effort to interpret a substantial 
question of law." App. to Juris. Statement 49a. 
4. 
the tax. 5 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed 
the circuit court and upheld the tax. 303 S.E.2d 706 
(1983). Viewing all of Armco's activities in the State as 
a "unitary business," the court held that the taxpayer had 
a substantial nexus with the State and that the taxpayer's 
total tax was fairly related to the services and benefits 
provided to Armco by the State. Id., at 714, 716. It 
also held that the tax did not discriminate against 
interstate commerce; while local manufacturers making 
sales in the State were exempt from the gross receipts 
tax, they paid a much higher manufacturing tax. 6 Id., at 
5The court appears to have construed the statute to 
avoid unconstitutionality. See App. to Juris. Statement 
26a. 
6w. Va. Code §11-13-2b imposes a manufacturing tax 
of .88% on the value of products manufactured in the 
State. The value of the products is measured by the gross 
proceeds derived from its sale. If the product is 
manufactured in part tiri'rout of State, the sale pr ice is 
multiplied by that po\-£ion of the manufacturer's payroll 
costs or total costs attributable to West Virginia. As 
• relevant here, the tax is imposed on "every person 
engaging or continuing within this State in the business 
of manufacturing, compounding or preparing for sale, 
profit, or commercial use, •.. any article ••. substance 
or commodity." Prior to 1971, the tax rate was .8%. 




We noted probable jurisdiction, u.s. (1983), 
and now reverse. Since we hold that West Virginia's tax 
does discriminate unconstitutionally against interstate 
commerce, we do not reach Armco's argument that there was 
not a sufficient nexus between the State and the sales at 
issue here to permit taxation of them. 
II 
It long has been established that the Commerce Clause 
of its own force protects free trade among the States. 
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 u.s. 318, 
328 (1976); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). 
One aspect of this protection is that a State "may not 
discriminate between transactions on the basis of some 
interstate element." Boston Stock Exchange, supra, at 
332, n. 12. That is, a State may not tax a transaction or 
incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than 
when it occurs entirely within the State. 
On its face, the gross receipts tax at issue here 
appears to have just this effect. The tax provides that 
two companies selling tangible property at wholesale in 
6. 
West Virginia will be treated differently depending on 
whether the taxpayer conducts manufacturing in the State 
or out of it. Thus, if the property was manufactured in 
the State, no tax on the sale is imposed. If the property 
was manufactured out of the State and imported for sale, a 
tax of . 27% is imposed on the sale pr ice. See General 
Motors v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 459 (1964) (Goldberg, 
J., dissenting) (identical provision in Washington "on its 
face, discriminated against interstate wholesale sales to 
Washington purchasers for it exempted the intrastate sales 
of locally made products while taxing the competing sales 
of interstate sellers"); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 30 
wash. 2d 658, __ , 197 P.2d 976, 979 (1948) (same). 
The court below was of the view that no such 
discrimination in favor of local, intrastate commerce 
occurred because taxpayers manufacturing in the State were 
subject to a far higher tax of • 88% of the sale pr ice. 
This view is mistaken. The gross sales tax imposed on 
Armco cannot be deemed a "compensating tax" for the 
manufacturing tax imposed on its West Virginia 
competitors. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 758-
759 (1981), the Court refused to consider a tax on the 




to be a complement of a severance tax in the same amount 
imposed on gas produced in the State. Severance and first 
f-.t::2-X-L L 'trv-, 
use--usually A processing--were ' ,: 
not "substantially 




Id., at 759. Here, too, manufacturing and 
selling are not "substantially equivalent 
such that the heavy tax on in-state 
manufacturers can be said to compensate for the admittedly 
lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out of State. 
Manufacturing frequently entails selling in the State, but 
we cannot say which portion of the manufacturing tax is 
attributable to manufacturing, and which portion to 
sales. 7 A 7k'aftlit manufacturing tax is not reduced when a 
West Virginia manufacturer sells its goods out of state, 
-? lA.- .. 
an is reduced when part of the manufacturing takes place 
out of state, makes clear that the manufacturing tax is 
just that, and not in part a proxy for the gross receipts 
~~-~ 
7one would expect that a manufact~ g tax might be 
larger than a gross receipts tax since ) sY manufacturer 
a~y; 1i1£Q§5:dB0iL~ ~€'-fie f i t.s il.J;lO services provided 
by the State than does a transient wholesaler. Cf. 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 
(1977) (state tax will be upheld if it is "fairly related 
to the services provided by the State"). 
8. 
tax imposed on Armco and other sellers from other States. 8 
Moreover, when the two taxes are considered together, 
discrimination against interstate commerce persists. If 
Ohio or any of the other 48 States imposes a like tax on 
its manufacturers--which they have every right to do--then 
Armco and others from out of State will pay both a 
8The court below relied upon Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 
366 u.s. 199 (1961). That case does not control because 
the statute there merely laid a nondiscriminatory tax on a 
particular kind of business, operating freezer ships in 
Alaska. This was deemed a different business from 
operating a cannery in Alaska, on which a different ( in 
fact, higher) tax was imposed. See id., at 205. There is 
no dispute that Armco and the exempt West Virginia 
manufacturers operate in precisely the same business of 
wholesaling in that State. That an exemption is required 
to ensure that the gross receipts tax will not apply to 
the latter makes this clear. The same is true of Caskey 
Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117, 119-120, 121 (1941), 
a case that in any event was decided under the now 
d.54'-CatdJid notion that only "direct" burdens on interstate 
A commerce were disapproved, while "indirect" burdens that 
were the result of taxation of intrastate commerce were 
constitutional, see id., at 120, and n. 4; Department of 
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 
u.s. 734, 750 (1978). ~ ~ 
We acknowledge th.at. ~Je.-\. rece~ dismissee- for want of 
a substantial federal question a case raising, inter alia, 
a nearly identical challenge to the West Virginia gross 
receipts tax. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Rose, 
u.s. (1982) (103 s.ct. 32). We have not hesitated 
toset aside such a precedent when the issue is given 
plenary consideration. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 
U.S. 380, 390, n. 9 (1979). 
9. 
manufacturing tax and a wholesale tax while sellers 
resident in West Virginia will pay only the manufacturing 
tax. For example, if Ohio were to adopt the precise 
scheme here, then an interstate seller would pay the 
manufacturing tax of . 88% and the gross receipts tax of 
.27%; a purely intrastate seller would pay only the 
manufacturing tax of • 88% and would be exempt from the 
gross receipts tax. 
Appellee suggests that we should require Armco to 
prove actual discriminatory impact on it by pointing to a 
State that imposes a manufacturing tax that results in a 
total burden higher than that imposed on Armco's 
competitors in West Virginia. This is not the test. In 
Franchise Tax Board, U.S. __ , Container Corp. v. 
(1983) (103 s.ct. 2942), the Court noted that a tax must 
have "what might be called internal consistency--that is 
the [tax] must be such that, if applied by every 
jurisdiction," there would be no impermissible 
interference with free trade. In that case, the Court was 
discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly 
apportioned to reflect the business conducted in the 
State. A similar rule applies where the allegation is 
that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate 
. ~·-
10. 
commerce. A tax that unfairly apportions income from 
other States is a form of discrimination against 
interstate commerce. See also id., at ( 2943) • Any 
other rule would mean that the constitutionality of West 
Virginia's tax laws would depend on the shifting 
complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States, and that 
the validity of the taxes imposed on each taxpayer would 
depend on the particular other States in which it 
operated. 9 
9what was said in a related context is relevant: 
"It is suggested, however, that the validity 
of a gross sales tax should depend on whether 
another State has also sought to impose its 
burden on the transactions. If another State 
has taxed the same interstate transaction, the 
burdensome consequences to interstate trade are 
undeniable. But that, for the time being, only 
one State has taxed is irrelevant to the kind of 
freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause 
generate. The immunities implicit in the 
Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power 
of a State can hardly be made to depend, in the 
world of practical affairs, on the shifting 
incidence of the varying tax laws of the various 
States at a particular moment. Courts are not 
possessed of instruments of determination so 
delicate as to enable them to weigh the various 
factors in a complicated economic setting which, 
as to an isolated application of a State tax, 
might mitigate the obvious burden generally 
created by a direct tax on commerce." 




~, ti/ ...,/...J 
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It is true that West 
simply by dividing its present .88% tax on manufacturers 
into a .61% tax on manufacturing and a .27% tax on 
wholesale selling. The resulting tax would not 
discriminate against interstate commerce. If such a tax 
were imposed by other States the result would be that all 
sellers--both interstate and intrastate--would pay .61% to 
the State in which they manufacture and .27% to the State 
in which they sell. Concededly, such a course would not 
benefit Armco, but we cannot be sure what remedy West 
Virginia will choose. The present .88% tax has a 
different economic effect than this split tax. If West 
Virginia has a high proportion of manufacturers who sell 
out of state, it may not desire to lower its tax revenues 
by reducing the tax collected from such manufacturers from 
.88% to .61%. The State thus may decide to maintain its 
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946). The court in 
Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d, at , 192 
P.2d, at 978-979, found this language dispositive in 
invalidating a Washington tax scheme identical to that 
here. See also Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 
u.s. 64, 72 (1963) (deleterious effects on free commerce 
of Louisiana's tax would be exacerbated "[i]f similar 
unequal tax structures were adopted in other States"). 
12 . 
. 88% manufacturing tax and extend its . 2 7% tax to all 
wholesale sellers in the State. 
It is also true, as the State of Washington appearing 
as amicus curiae points out, that Armco would be faced 
with the same situation that it complains of here if Ohio 
(or some other State) imposed a tax only upon 
manufacturing, while West Virginia imposed a tax only upon 
wholesaling. In that situation, Armco would bear two 
taxes, while West Virginia sellers would bear only one. 
But such a result would not arise from impermissible 
discrimination against interstate commerce but from fair 
encouragement of in-state business. What we said in 
Boston Stock Exchange, supra, at 336-337, is relevant here 
as well: 
"Our decision today does not prevent the 
States from structuring their tax systems to 
encourage the growth and development of 
intrastate commerce and industry. Nor do we 
hold that a State may not compete with other 
States for a share of interstate commerce: such 
competition lies at the heart of a free trade 
policy. We hold only that in the process of 
competition no State may discriminatorily tax 
the products manufactured or the business 
operations performed in any other State." 
The judgment below is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
• 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this appeal an Ohio corporation claims that West Virgin-
ia's wholesale gross receipts tax, from which local manufac-
turers are exempt, unconstitutionally discriminates against 
interstate commerce. We agree and reverse the state 
court's judgment upholding the tax. 
I 
Appellant Armco Inc. is an Ohio corporation qualified to do 
business in West Virginia. Its primary business is manufac-
turing and selling steel products. From 1970 through 1975, 
the time at issue here, Armco conducted business in West 
Virginia through five divisions or subdivisions. Two of these 
had facilities and employees in the State, while the other 
three sold various products to customers in the State only 
through franchisees or nonresident traveling salesmen. 1 
1 The company's Mining Division mined, cleaned, and sold coal in the 
State, and part of the Metal Products Division sold various construction 
and drainage products through an office in the State staffed by three em-
ployees. The Metal Products Division's metal buildings were sold in the 
State exclusively by two franchised dealers resident in the State. The 
Steel Group and the Union Wire Rope Group had no office in West Virginia 
but sold steel and wire rope through nonresident traveling salesmen who 
solicited sales from customers in the State. 
2 
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West Virginia imposes a gross receipts tax on persons en-
gaged in the business of selling tangible property at whole-
sale. W. Va. Code § 11-13-2c (1983). 2 For the years 1970 
through 1975 Armco took the position that the gross receipts 
tax could not be imposed on the sales it made through fran-
chisees and nonresident salesmen. In addition, because local 
manufacturers were exempt from the tax, see id., 
§ 11-13-2,3 Armco argued that the tax discriminated against 
interstate commerce. After a hearing, the State Tax Com-
missioner, who is appellee here, determined that the tax was 
properly assessed on the sales at issue, and that Armco had 
not shown the tax was discriminatory. 4 The Circuit Court 
of Kanawha County reversed, holding that the nexus be-
2 For the years 1971 through 1975, § 11-13-2c provided, in relevant 
part: / 
"Upon every person engaging or continuing within this State in the busi-
ness of selling any tangible property whatsoever, real or personal, ... 
there is ... hereby levied, and shall be collected, ;i tax equivalent to fifty-
five one hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the business, ex-
cept that in the business of selling at wholesale the tax shall be equal to 
twenty-seven one hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the 
business." 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169. 
The tax on wholesale gross receipts was .25% prior to 1971. 1959 W. Va. 
Acts, ch. 167. 
3 W. Va. Code § 11-13-2 provides an exemption for persons engaged in 
the State in manufacturing or in extracting natural resources, and selling 
their products. For the years at issue here, it read as follows: 
"[A]ny person exercising any privilege taxable under sections two-a [ex-
tracting and producing natural resources for sale] or two-b [manufacturing] 
of this article and engaging in the business of selling his natural resources 
or manufactured products to producers of natural resources, manufactur-
ers, wholesalers, jobbers, retailers or commercial consumers for use or 
consumption in the purchaser's business shall not be requred to pay the tax 
imposed in section two-c [§ 11-13-2c] of this article." 1955 W. Va. Acts, 
ch. 165; 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169. 
'The Commissioner waived statutory penalties on the disputed amount 
because he found that Armco's objections were a "good faith effort to inter-
pret a substantial question of law." App. to Juris. Statement 49a. 
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tween the sales and the State was insufficient to support im-
position of the tax. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the 
circuit court and upheld the tax. 303 S. E. 2d 706 (1983). 
Viewing all of Armco's activities in the State as a "unitary 
business," the court held that the taxpayer had a substantial 
nexus with the State and that the taxpayer's total tax was 
fairly related to the services and benefits provided to Armco 
by the State. Id., at 714, 716. It also held that the tax did 
not discriminate against interstate commerce; while local 
manufacturers making sales in the State were exempt from 
the gross receipts tax, they paid a much higher manufactur-
ing tax. 5 Id., at 711>-717. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, --U. S. -- (1983), and 
now reverse. Since we hold that West Virginia's tax does 
discriminate unconstitutionally against interstate commerce, 
we do not reach Armco's argument that there was not a suffi-
cient nexus between the State and the sales at issue here to 
permit taxation of them. 
II 
It long has been established that the Commerce Clause of 
its own force protects free trade among the States. Boston 
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 328 
(1977); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). One 
aspect of this protection is that a State "may not discriminate 
between transactions on the basis of some interstate ele-
ment." Boston Stock Exchange, supra, at 332, n. 12. That 
0 W. Va. Code § 11-13--2b imposes a manufacturing tax of .88% on the 
value of products manufactured in the State. The value of the products is 
measured by the gross proceeds derived from its sale. If the product is 
manufactured in part out of State, the sale price is multiplied by that por-
tion of the manufacturer's payroll costs or total costs attributable to West 
Virginia. As relevant here, the tax is imposed on "every person engaging 
or continuing within this State in the business of manufacturing, com-
pounding or preparing for sale, profit, or commercial use, ... any article 
... substance or ... commodity." Prior to 1971, the tax rate was .8%. 
1967 W. Va. Acts, ch. 188; see 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169. 
4 
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is, a State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily 
when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within 
the State. 
On its face, the gross receipts tax at issue here appears to 
have just this effect. The tax provides that two companies 
selling tangible property at wholesale in West Virginia will 
be treated differently depending on whether the taxpayer 
conducts manufacturing in the State or out of it. Thus, if the 
property was manufactured in the State, no tax on the sale is 
imposed. If the property was manufactured out of the State 
and imported for sale, a tax of .27% is imposed on the sale 
price. See General Motors v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436, 
459 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (similar provision in 
Washington "on its face, discriminated against interstate 
wholesale sales to Washington purchasers for it exempted 
the intrastate sales of locally made products while taxing the 
competing sales of interstate sellers"); Columbia Steel Co. v. 
State, 30 Wash. 2d 658, 664, 192 P. 2d 976, 979 (1948) (invali-
dating Washington tax). 
The court below was of the view that no such discrimina-
. tion in favor of local, intrastate commerce occurred because 
taxpayers manufacturing in the State were subject to a far 
higher tax of .88% of the sale price. This view is mistaken. 
The gross sales tax imposed on Armco cannot be deemed a 
"compensating tax" for the manufacturing tax imposed on its 
West Virginia competitors. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 
U. S. 725, 758-759 (1981), the Court refused to consider a tax 
on the first use in Louisiana of gas brought in from out of 
State to be a complement of a severance tax in the same 
amount imposed on gas produced in the State. Severance 
and first use or processing were not "substantially equivalent 
. events" on which compensating taxes might be imposed. 
Id., at 759. Here, too, manufacturing and wholesaling are 
not "substantially equivalent event[s]" such that the heavy 
tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate for 
the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out 
. . 
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of State. Manufacturing frequently entails selling in the 
State, but we cannot say which portion of the manufacturing 
tax is attributable to manufacturing, and which portion to 
sales. 6 The fact that the manufacturing tax is not reduced 
when a West Virginia manufacturer sells its goods out of 
state, and that it is reduced when part of the manufacturing 
takes place out of state, makes clear that the manufacturing 
tax is just that, and not in part a proxy for the gross receipts 
tax imposed on Armco and other sellers from other States. 7 
Moreover, when the two taxes are considered together, 
discrimination against interstate commerce persists. If Ohio 
6 One would expect that a manufacturing tax might be larger than a 
gross receipts tax since an in-state manufacturer normally benefits to a 
greater extent from services provided by the State than does a transient 
wholesaler. Cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 
(1977) (state tax will be upheld if it is "fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the State"). . 
'The court below relied upon Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199 
(1961). That case does not control because the statute there merely laid a 
nondiscriminatory tax on a particular kind of business, operating freezer 
ships in Alaska. This was deemed a different business from operating a 
cannery in Alaska, on which a different (in fact, higher) tax was imposed. 
See id., at 205. There is no dispute that Armco and the exempt West Vir-
ginia manufacturers operate in precisely the same business of wholesaling 
in that State. That an exemption is required to ensure that the gross re-
ceipts tax will not apply to the latter makes this clear. The same is true of 
Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117, 119-120, 121 (1941). The 
latter case in any event was decided under the now rejected notion that 
only "direct" burdens on interstate commerce were disapproved, while "in-
direct" burdens that were the result of taxation of intrastate commerce 
were constitutional. See id., at 120, and n. 4; Department of Revenue v. 
Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 750 (1978). 
This distinction also appears to have governed the definition of the busi-
ness in which the taxpayer was engaged. 
We acknowledge our recent dismissal for want of a substantial federal 
question of a case raising, inter alia, a nearly identical challenge to the 
West Virginia gross receipts tax. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. 
Rose, -- U. S. -- (1982). We may find it necessary not to follow such 
a precedent when the issue is given plenary consideration. See, e.g., 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 390, n. 9 (1979). 
6 
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or any of the other 48 States imposes a like tax on its manu-
facturers-which they have every :right to do-then Armco 
and others from out of State will pay both a manufacturing 
tax and a wholesale tax while sellers resident in West Vir-
ginia will pay only the manufacturing tax. For example, if 
Ohio were to adopt the precise scheme here, then an inter-
state seller would pay the manufacturing tax of .88% and the 
gross receipts tax of .27%; a purely intrastate seller would 
pay only the manufacturing tax of .88% and would be exempt 
from the gross receipts tax. 
Appellee suggests that we should require Armco to prove 
actual discriminatory impact on it by pointing to a State that 
imposes a manufacturing tax that results in a total burden 
higher than that imposed on Armco's competitors in West 
Virginia. This is not the test. In Container Corp. of Amer-
ica v. Franchise Tax Board, -- U.S. --, -- (1983), 
the Court noted that a tax must have "what might be called 
internal consistency-that is the [tax] must be such that, if 
applied by every jurisdiction," there would be no impermissi-
ble interference with free trade. In that case, the Court was 
discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned to 
reflect the business conducted in the State. A similar rule 
applies where the allegation is that a tax on its face discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce. A tax that unfairly ap-
portions income from other States is a form of discrimination 
against interstate commerce. See also id., at --. Any 
other rule would mean that the constitutionality of West Vir-
ginia's tax laws would depend on the shifting complexities of 
the tax codes of 49 other States, and that the validity of the 
taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the particu-
lar other States in which it operated. 8 
8 What was said in a related context is relevant: 
"It is suggested, however, that the validity of a gross sales tax should 
depend on whether another State has also sought to impose its burden on 
the transactions. If another State has taxed the same interstate transac-
tion, the burdensome consequences to interstate trade are undeniable. 
But that, for the time being, only one State has taxed is irrelevant to the 
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It is true, as the State of Washington appearing as amicus 
curiae points out, that Armco would be faced with the same 
situation that it complains of here if Ohio (or some other 
State) imposed a tax only upon manufacturing, while West 
Virginia imposed a tax only upon wholesaling. In that situa-
tion, Armco would bear two taxes, while West Virginia sell-
ers would bear only one. But such a result would not arise 
from impermissible discrimination against interstate com-
merce but from fair encouragement of in-state business. 
What we said in Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U. S., at 
336-337, is relevant here as well: 
"Our decision today does not prevent the States from 
structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth 
and development of intrastate commerce and industry. 
Nor do we hold that a State may not compete with other 
States for a share of interstate commerce; such compe-
tition lies at the heart of a free trade policy. We hold 
only that in the process of competition no State may dis-
criminatorily tax the products manufactured or the busi-
ness operations performed in any other State." 
The judgment below is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
kind of freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The im- , 
munities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of 
a State can hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on 
the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a par-
ticular moment. Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination 
so delicate as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated · 
economic setting which, as to an isolated application of a State tax, might 
mitigate the obvious burden generally created by a direct tax on 
commerce." 
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 256 (1946). The court in Columbia Steel 
Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d, at 662--664, 192 P. 2d, at 97~979, found this 
language dispositive in invalidating a Washington tax scheme identical to 
that here. See also Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 72 
(1963) (deleterious effects on free commerce of Louisiana's tax would be ex-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
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ARMCO INC., APPELLANT v. DAVID C. HARDESTY, 
JR., STATE TAX COMMISSIONER OF 
WEST VIRGINIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF 
WEST VIRGINIA 
[May-, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this appeal an Ohio corporation claims that West Virgin-
ia's wholesale gross receipts tax, from which local manufac-
turers are exempt, unconstitutionally discriminates against 
interstate commerce. We agree and reverse the state 
court's judgment upholding the tax. 
I 
Appellant Armco Inc. is an Ohio corporation qualified to do 
business in West Virginia. Its primary business is manufac-
turing and selling steel products. From 1970 through 1975, 
the time at issue here, Armco conducted business in West 
Virginia through five divisions or subdivisions. Two of these 
had facilities and employees in the State, while the other 
three sold various products to customers in the State only 
through franchisees or nonresident traveling salesmen. 1 
1 The company's Mining Division mined, cleaned, and sold coal in the 
State, and part of the Metal Products Division sold various construction 
and drainage products through an office in the State staffed by three em-
ployees. The Metal Products Division's metal buildings were sold in the 
State exclusively by two franchised dealers resident in the State. The 
Steel Group and the Union Wire Rope Group had no office in West Virginia 
but sold steel and wire rope through nonresident traveling salesmen who 
solicited sales from customers in the State. 
2 
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West Virginia imposes a gross receipts tax on persons en-
gaged in the business of selling tangible property at whole-
sale. W. Va. Code § 11-13-2c (1983). 2 For the years 1970 
through 1975 Armco took the position that the gross receipts 
tax could not be imposed on the sales it made through fran-
chisees and nonresident salesmen. In addition, because local 
manufacturers were exempt from the tax, see id., 
§ 11-13-2,3 Armco argued that the tax discriminated against 
interstate commerce. After a hearing, the State Tax Com-
missioner, who is appellee here, determined that the tax was 
properly assessed on the sales at issue, and that Armco had 
not shown the tax was discriminatory. 4 The Circuit Court 
of Kanawha County reversed, holding that the nexus be-
2 For the years 1971 through 1975, § 11-13-2c provided, in relevant 
part: 
"Upon every person engaging or continuing within this State in the busi-
ness of selling any tangible property whatsoever, real or personal, ... 
there is ... hereby levied, and shall be collected, a tax equivalent to fifty-
five one hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the business, ex-
cept that in the business of selling at wholesale the tax shall be equal to 
twenty-seven one hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the 
business." 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169. 
The tax on wholesale gross receipts was .25% prior to 1971. 1959 W. Va. 
Acts, ch. 167. 
3 W. Va. Code § 11-13-2 provides an exemption for persons engaged in 
the State in manufacturing or in extracting natural resources, and selling 
their products. For the years at issue here, it read as follows: 
"[A]ny person exercising any privilege taxable under sections two-a [ex-
tracting and producing natural resources for sale] or two-b [manufacturing] 
of this article and engaging in the business of selling his natural resources 
or manufactured products to producers of natural resources, manufactur-
ers, wholesalers, jobbers, retailers or commercial consumers for use or 
consumption in the purchaser's business shall not be requred to pay the tax 
imposed in section two-c [§ ll-13-2c] of this article." 1955 W. Va. Acts, 
ch. 165; 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169. 
'The Commissioner waived statutory penalties on the disputed amount 
because he found that Armco's objections were a "good faith effort to inter-
pret a substantial question of law." App. to Juris. Statement 49a. 
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tween the sales and the State was insufficient to support im-
position of the tax. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the 
circuit court and upheld the tax. 303 S. E. 2d 706 (1983). 
Viewing all of Armco's activities in the State as a "unitary 
business," the court held that the taxpayer had a substantial 
nexus with the State and that the taxpayer's total tax was 
fairly related to the services and benefits provided to Armco 
by the State. Id., at 714, 716. It also held that the tax did 
not discriminate against interstate commerce; while local 
manufacturers making sales in the State were exempt from 
the gross receipts tax, they paid a much higher manufactur-
ing tax. 5 Id., at 71&-717. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, --U. S. --(1983), and 
now reverse. Since we hold that West Virginia's tax does 
discriminate unconstitutionally against interstate commerce, 
we do not reach Armco's argument that there was not a suffi-
cient nexus between the State and the sales at issue here to 
permit taxation of them. 
II 
It long has been established that the Commerce Clause of 
its own force protects free trade among the States. Boston 
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 328 
(1977); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). One 
aspect of this protection is that a State "may not discriminate 
between transactions on the basis of some interstate ele-
ment." Boston Stock Exchange, supra, at 332, n. 12. That 
' W. Va. Code § 11-13-2b imposes a manufacturing tax of .88% on the 
value of products manufactured in the State. The value of the products is 
measured by the gross proceeds derived from its sale. If the product is 
manufactured in part out of State, the sale price is multiplied by that por-
tion of the manufacturer's payroll costs or total costs attributable to West 
Virginia. As relevant here, the tax is imposed on "every person engaging 
or continuing within this State in the business of manufacturing, com-
pounding or preparing for sale, profit, or commercial use, ... any article 
.. . substance or ... commodity. " Prior to 1971, the tax rate was .8%. 
1967 W. Va. Acts, ch. 188; see 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169. 
4 
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is, a State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily 
when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within 
the State. 
On its face, the gross receipts tax at issue here appears to 
have just this effect. The tax provides that two companies 
selling tangible property at wholesale in West Virginia will 
be treated differently depending on whether the taxpayer 
conducts manufacturing in the State or out of it. Thus, if the 
property was manufactured in the State, no tax on the sale is 
imposed. If the property was manufactured out of the State 
and imported for sale, a tax of .27% is imposed on the sale 
price. See General Motors v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436, 
459 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (similar provision in 
Washington "on its face, discriminated against interstate 
wholesale sales to Washington purchasers for it exempted 
the intrastate sales of locally made products while taxing the 
competing sales of interstate sellers"); Columbia Steel Co. v. 
State, 30 Wash. 2d 658, 664, 192 P. 2d 976, 979 (1948) (invali-
dating Washington tax). 
The court below was of the view that no such discrimina-
tion in favor of local, intrastate commerce occurred because 
taxpayers manufacturing in the State were subject to a far 
higher tax of .88% of the sale price. This view is mistaken. 
The gross sales tax imposed on Armco cannot be deemed a 
"compensating tax" for the manufacturing tax imposed on its 
West Virginia competitors. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 
U. S. 725, 758--759 (1981), the Court refused to consider a tax 
on the first use in Louisiana of gas brought in from out of 
State to be a complement of a severance tax in the same 
amount imposed on gas produced in the State. Severance 
and first use or processing were not "substantially equivalent 
events" on which compensating taxes might be imposed. 
Id., at 759. Here, too, manufacturing and wholesaling are 
not "substantially equivalent event[s]" such that the heavy 
tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate for 
the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out 
~297-OPINION 
ARMCO, INC. v. HARDESTY 5 
of State. Manufacturing frequently entails selling in the 
State, but we cannot say which portion of the manufacturing 
tax is attributable to manufacturing, and which portion to 
sales. 6 The fact that the manufacturing tax is not reduced 
when a West Virginia manufacturer sells its goods out of 
state, and that it is reduced when part of the manufacturing 
takes place out of state, makes clear that the manufacturing 
tax is just that, and not in part a proxy for the gross receipts 
tax imposed on Armco and other sellers from other States. 7 
Moreover, when the two taxes are considered together, 
discrimination against interstate commerce persists. If Ohio 
6 One would expect that a manufacturing tax might be larger than a 
gross receipts tax since an in-state manufacturer normally benefits to a 
greater extent from services provided by the State than does a transient 
wholesaler. Cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 
(1977) (state tax will be upheld if it is "fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the State"). 
7 The court below relied upon Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199 
(1961). That case does not control because the statute there merely laid a 
nondiscriminatory tax on a particular kind of business, operating freezer 
ships in Alaska. This was deemed a different business from operating a 
cannery in Alaska, on which a different (in fact, higher) tax was imposed. 
See id., at 205. There is no dispute that Armco and the exempt West Vir-
ginia manufacturers operate in precisely the same business of wholesaling 
in that State. That an exemption is required to ensure that the gross re-
ceipts tax will not apply to the latter makes this clear. The same is true of 
Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117, 119--120, 121 (1941). The 
latter case in any event was decided under the now rejected notion that 
only "direct" burdens on interstate commerce were disapproved, while "in-
direct" burdens that were the result of taxation of intrastate commerce 
were constitutional. See id., at 120, and n. 4; Department of Revenue v. 
Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 750 (1978). 
This distinction also appears to have governed the definition of the busi-
ness in which the taxpayer was engaged. 
We acknowledge our recent dismissal for want of a substantial federal 
question of a case raising, inter alia, a nearly identical challenge to the 
West Virginia gross receipts tax. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. 
Rose, -- U. S. -- (1982). We may find it necessary not to follow such 
a precedent when the issue is given plenary consideration. See, e.g., 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 390, n. 9 (1979). 
6 
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or any of the other 48 States imposes a like tax on its manu-
facturers-which they have every right to do-then Armco 
and others from out of State will pay both a manufacturing 
tax and a wholesale tax while sellers resident in West Vir-
ginia will pay only the manufacturing tax. For example, if 
Ohio were to adopt the precise scheme here, then an inter-
state seller would pay the manufacturing tax of .88% and the 
gross receipts tax of .27%; a purely intrastate seller would 
pay only the manufacturing tax of .88% and would be exempt 
from the gross receipts tax. 
Appellee suggests that we should require Armco to prove 
actual discriminatory impact on it by pointing to a State that 
imposes a manufacturing tax that results in a total burden 
higher than that imposed on Armco's competitors in West 
Virginia. This is not the test. In Container Corp. of Amer-
ica v. Franchise Tax Board, -- U.S.--, -- (1983), 
the Court noted that a tax must have "what might be called 
internal consistency-that is the [tax] must be such that, if 
applied by every jurisdiction," there would be no impermissi-
ble interference with free trade. In that case, the Court was 
discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned to 
reflect the business conducted in the State. A similar rule 
applies where the allegation is that a tax on its face discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce. A tax that unfairly ap-
portions income from other States is a form of discrimination 
against interstate commerce. See also id., at --. Any 
other rule would mean that the constitutionality of West Vir-
ginia's tax laws would depend on the shifting complexities of 
the tax codes of 49 other States, and that the validity of the 
taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the particu-
lar other States in which it operated. 8 
8 What was said in a related context is relevant: 
"It is suggested, however, that the validity of a gross sales tax should 
depend on whether another State has also sought to impose its burden on 
the transactions. If another State has taxed the same interstate transac-
tion, the burdensome consequences to interstate trade are undeniable. 
But that, for the time being, only one State has taxed is irrelevant to the 
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It is true, as the State of Washington appearing as amicus 
curiae points out, that Armco would be faced with the same 
situation that it complains of here if Ohio (or some other 
State) imposed a tax only upon manufacturing, while West 
Virginia imposed a tax only upon wholesaling. In that situa-
tion, Armco would bear two taxes, while West Virginia sell-
ers would bear only one. But such a result would not arise 
from impermissible discrimination against interstate com-
merce but from fair encouragement of in-state business. 
What we said in Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U. S., at 
33~37, is relevant here as well: 
"Our decision today does not prevent the States from 
structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth 
and development of intrastate commerce and industry. 
Nor do we hold that a State may not compete with other 
States for a share of interstate commerce; such compe-
tition lies at the heart of a free trade policy. We . hold 
only that in the process of competition no State may dis-
criminatorily tax the products manufactured or the busi-
ness operations performed in any other State." 
The judgment below is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
kind of freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The im-
munities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of 
a State can hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on 
the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a par-
ticular moment. Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination 
so delicate as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated 
economic setting which, as to an isolated application of a State tax, might 
mitigate the obvious burden generally created by a direct tax on 
commerce." 
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 256 (1946). The court in Columbia Steel 
Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d, at 662--664, 192 P. 2d, at 978-979, found this 
language dispositive in invalidating a Washington tax scheme identical to 
that here. See also Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 72 
(1963) (deleterious effects on free commerce of Louisiana's tax would be ex-
acerbated "[i]f similar unequal tax structures were adopted in other 
States"). 
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ARMCO INC. v. DAVID C. HARDESTY, JR., STATE 
TAX COMMISSSIONER OF WEST VIRGINIA 
:_ ~, 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 
OF WEST VIRGINIA 
[June -, 1984] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
The Court today strikes down West Virginia's wholesale 
gross receipts tax, finding tnatthe wholesale tax unconstitu-
tionally discriminates against interstate commerce, because 
local manufacturers are granted an exemption from the 
wholesale tax if they pay a manufacturing tax on their gross 
manufacturing receipts. Appellant's arguments, however, 
effectively rest on the hypo~ might face if an-
other State fev1ect a corresponoing tax on its manufactures. 
Because appellants have not shown that the taxes paid by 
out-of-state wholesalers on the same goods are higher than 
the taxes paid by in-state manufacturer-wholesalers, I would 
affirm the decision below. It is plain that West Virginia's 
tax would be unconstitutionally discriminatory if it levied no 
l 
tax on manufacturing or taxed manufacturing at a lower rate 
than wholesaling, for then the out-of-state wholesaler would 
be paying a higher tax than the in-state manufacturer-whole-
saler. But that is not the case here. Instead, a manufac-
turer selling his products at wholesale in West Virginia pays 
a much higher overall tax rate than the out-of-state whole-
saler. The Court dismisses that fact, asserting that because 
in-state manufacturers formally pay no wholesale tax, the 
taxing scheme is-facially discriminatory: The Court also re-
jects the possiblilty that West Virginia's manufacturing tax 
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Neither of these reasons, in my view, supports invalidating 
the State's wholesale tax scheme. Our prior decisions indi-
cate that when considering whether a tax is discriminatory, 
"equality for the purposes of competition and the fl.ow of com-
merce is measured in dollars and cents, not legal abstrac-
tions." Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 70 
(1963)(footnote omitted). See also Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U. S. 725, 756 (1981)(state tax must be examined for 
r 
practical effect). Examining the State's tax structure as a 
whole, see Washington v. United States, -- U.S. --, 
-- (1983), it is plain that West Virgina has not created a tax 
granting a direct commercial advantage to local businesses. 
See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 
U. S. 318, 329 (1977)(transfer tax on local stock sales one-half 
the rate imposed on out-of-state sales). Under West Virgin-
ia's taxing scheme, in-state manufacturer-wholesalers pay a 
tax rate of .88% on the value of the manufactured product, 
while out-of-state wholesalers pay only a .27% tax on the 
wholesale value. Thus, at the wholesale level at which ap-
pellant competes with in-state manufactured goods, it ~uite 
likely that appellant pays much less in state taxes than any 
in-state manufacturer-wholesaler. This fact, in my view, 
suffices to rebut appellant's argument that the State's whole-
sale tax discriminates against interstate trade. Cf. Wash-
ington v. United States, -- U. S. --, -- (1983)(federal 
' Government and federal contractors pay less tax than local 
contractors); Alaska v. Artie Maid, 366 U. S. 199, 204 
(1961)(local fish processors paid higher tax).* 
*Admittedly, because the tax paid by manufacturers is imposed on the \ 
manufactured value, while wholesalers pay a tax on the wholesale value, it 
is theoreticall possible for appellant to pay a higher amount of tax than an 
in-sta e manufac er. For this to happen, however, the wholesale value 
would have to be more than three and one-quarter times the manufactured 
value. In normal practice this price differential would seem unlikely. In 
any event, appellant has failed to show that it in fact pays a higher tax than 
an in-state manufacturer. Cf. General Motors v. Washington, 377 U. S. 
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The Court also justifies its decision on the ground that if 
Ohio, where appellant manufactures its products sold in West 
Virginia, or any of the other 48 states imposed a manufactur-
ing tax, appellant would pay possibly more taxes on its goods 
sold in West Virgina than a local manufacturer. But appel-
lant has not demonstrated that it in fact pays a higher tax 
burden in West Virgina solely by reason of interstate com-
merce. The Court sidesteps that fact, however, by borrow-
ing a concept employed in our net income tax cases. Under 
that line of cases a state tax must have an internal consis-
tency that takes into consideration the impact on interstate 
commerce if other jurisdictions employed the same tax. See 
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, --
U. S. --, -- (1983). It is perfectly proper to examine a 
State's net income tax system for hypothethical burdens on 
interstate commerce. Nevertheless, that form of analysis is 
irrelevant to examining the validity of a gross receipts tax 
system based on manufacturing or wholesale transactions. 
Where a State's taxes are linked exactly to the activities 
taxed, it should be unnecessary to examine a hypothetical 
taxing scheme to-see if interstate commerce would be unduly 
burdened. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington 
Revenue Dep't., 419 U. S. 560,564 (1975); cf. Commonwealth 
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 617 (1981). 
The Court's analysis also elll_ploys a formalism I thought 
we had generally abandoned in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 288-289, n. 15 (1977), where we re-
jected the per se rule and the administrative convenience that 
attended our former holding in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. 
O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951). I would apply a similarly 
realistic approach to this case and uphold West Virginia's 
wholesale tax scheme. 
CHAMBERS OF' 
j,ltpftntt <!tonrl af tqt ~b j,taftg 
Jfulp:ng-htn, ~. <!t, 21lffe~~ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE May 3Q, 1984 
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